Together with the American Association of Health Plans (AAHP), we surveyed health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in 1998 to characterize their basic structure and management strategies. The findings show that more than half of HMO enrollees belong to plans that contract with primary care physician (PCP) groups on a predominantly capitated basis. Such plans tend to be larger and to contract with large physician groups. Thirty percent to 40% of enrollees are in plans that delegate utilization and network management to physician groups paid by capitation, but plans almost never delegate these functions to groups paid by fee-for-service. Plans tend to retain quality assurance functions irrespective of whether they use fee-for-service or capitation as a basis for physician payment. The autonomy of PCPs to order tests and procedures varies with the test and procedure.
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For members of the Harvard Managed Care Industry Center Group see the notes section of this paper. This study was supported by a grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Address correspondence to Joseph P. Newhouse, Ph.D., Harvard University, 180 Longwood Ave., Boston, MA 02115. Managed care now dominates the financing of medical care among the nonelderly in the United States; in 2001, 93% of individuals with employer-sponsored health insurance were enrolled in some form of managed care, and only 7% remained in traditional indemnity plans (Gabel et al. 2001 ). These percentages are almost the reverse of those from the 1950s through 1970s.
Managed care plans gained market share by promising lower costs than traditional indemnity plans. They used two methods to lower cost. First, they obtained favorable prices from physicians and hospitals by including them in networks. Managed care enrollees typically faced less cost sharing from using network physicians (Ma and McGuire 1999) . Second, despite less cost sharing at the time of use than the typical indemnity insurance policy, plans sought to reduce use of low-valued medical services; that is, they aimed to reduce moral hazard. To do so, plans employed both financial incentives to physicians to reduce service use, and nonfinancial methods such as prior authorization and utilization review. Both techniques, of course, left open the possibility that high-valued services would be reduced, one explanation of the current political demand for patient protection legislation (Rosenthal and Newhouse 2002) .
Furthermore, as the Institute of Medicine has emphasized, organized systems of care offer great potential advantages in quality improvement efforts (Institute of Medicine 2001). In principle, plans can improve the quality of care by better coordinating care across providers, maintaining a centralized record, excluding poorly performing providers from a network, and offering financial incentives to improve the quality of care, among other tools.
Consistent with the promises of managed care to reduce costs, the years 1993 to 1997 saw the lowest sustained increases in real medical spending of any five-year period in the past half century; real per capita spending increases were about two percentage points lower in each year than the historical average rate of increase (Newhouse 2001) . Many believe much or all of this reduction can be attributed to the spread of managed care. Although successful in its efforts to reduce cost, managed care appears to have had mixed effects on quality (Miller and Luft 1994, 1997) , perhaps because of the varied methods used by managed care plans to address issues of quality and perhaps because managed care plans have had little effect on the delivery of care (Kohn 2000) .
Despite its favorable effect on cost and lack of a clear verdict on quality, managed care has generated a widespread backlash among the general public. It is among the least popular of all industries, though it does manage to top the tobacco industry (Blendon et al. 1998) . Major class-action lawsuits are pending against the managed care industry, along with demands at both the federal and state levels for patient protection legislation.
Perhaps as a result of the backlash, or simply from learning, the industry has evolved. Plans generally have become less restrictive, and networks have become less exclusive (Robinson 2001; Draper et al. 2002) . Although it never may have been widespread, utilization review is now little used, perhaps because of high transactions costs and provider and patient resistance (Remler et al. 1997; Remler, Gray, and Newhouse 2000) . The term ''managed care lite'' has come into the lexicon, along with provider consolidation and a renewal of cost increases (Gabel et al. 2001; Levit et al. 2002) .
Despite the dominance of managed care and an abundance of anecdotes, systematic information about how the industry operates is sparse, with only a modest amount of data available (Gold et al. 1995; Robinson and Casalino 1995, 2001; Landon and Epstein 1999, 2001; Robinson 1999; Draper et al. 2002) . To add to the information available, we collaborated with the American Association of Health Plans (AAHP) in carrying out an industry survey in 1998. Our data thus provide a snapshot of the industry at this point in time. Of the studies noted earlier, the only one that is close to ours in terms of questions asked and sampling frame is Gold et al. (1995) . Insofar as Gold et al.' s results can be compared with ours, they appear broadly consistent with them. 1
Survey Content
We gathered data on the size distribution of plans, since larger plans have more effect on the elasticity of demand faced by a provider and hence more leverage with which to affect both the unit price and the nature of care. Larger plans thus should be more successful.
To ascertain methods for controlling utilization, we asked about incentives for both consumers and providers. We asked about beneficiary cost sharing and the degree of financial risk shifted to physicians, as well as the degree to which medical services were subcontracted or carved out rather than managed by the plan itself.
We asked numerous questions about techniques that plans use to affect the nature of services that a physician delivers. Because of the differences in financial incentives, plans that contract more on a fee-for-service basis and less on a capitated basis may need to rely more on nonfinancial techniques to reduce moral hazard. We therefore sought to determine whether the degree of physician autonomy differed by contracting arrangement. We also asked whether contracts offered financial incentives that rewarded care thought to be of higher quality. We asked whether plans sent enrollees reminders about preventive care and whether plans collected data on provider behavior and fed it back to providers.
We asked several questions about plans' choices in structuring their networks. One tool a plan can use to increase its share of a primary care physician's practice is to require that the physician have a minimum number of plan patients; we asked whether plans imposed such a requirement. For a given enrollment, plans with smaller networks should have a higher share of a physician's practice, and thus a greater ability to influence both reimbursement to the provider and the provider's delivery of care (e.g., adherence to guidelines) (Beaulieu 1998) . As a result, we asked whether most primary care physicians (PCPs) in a market were in a plan's network. We also asked whether plans used quality information that they collected in choosing providers for their networks. As already noted, quality and cost can vary with the degree of autonomy afforded a physician; to assess this point further, we asked about the ability of the PCP to make specific types of referrals without prior authorization. Finally, to round out a picture of the industry, we asked about certain administrative aspects of the plan's operations, such as marketing, member services, and provider relations.
Data and Methods

Sampling Plan and Unit of Observation
We wished to study all types of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), so we included the independent practice association (IPA) model, as well as group and staff model HMOs in our population. We used the American Association of Health Plans Census of Health Plans to define the universe of plans. Because preferred provider organizations (PPOs) differ substantially from HMOs and largely confine their activities to reducing unit price, we excluded from our analysis those organizations that responded to the survey by classifying themselves as PPOs. In 1998, 28% of the U.S. population was enrolled in an HMO (National Center for Health Statistics 2001). 2 Our unit of observation consisted of any HMO or part of an HMO operating within a state. We considered national plans that decentralized their operations to state or substate areas to be separate organizations for each area, and asked them to complete separate questionnaires for each component plan. Thus, most observations in our sample are plan-state combinations. In a few cases, natural markets crossed state lines, for example, Kansas City, Mo., and Kansas City, Kan. We asked plans that operated in such markets to respond for the primary state and to complete a supplemental page, giving mainly enrollment information, for each additional state in their market. In such cases, we treated the plan and all its market components as a single observation. In the case of national plans, we encouraged response at the local level because the survey asked about plan operations that might not be well known at national corporate headquarters; nonetheless, we know some plans completed the questionnaires at their national offices. Although this may have caused some inaccuracy, we have no reason to believe it caused bias in the results that we report.
We originally sought data from each local operating unit, meaning a health plan or component of one with a common management structure, a distinct provider network, and a single set of operating procedures. If, for example, a staff model HMO merged with an IPA model in the same geographic area, but the network management and provider incentives remained separate, we wished to treat these as two local operating units. Unfortunately, this concept proved too difficult to implement in a mail survey, so we defined the survey's unit of observation as a plan's operation within a state.
Survey Implementation and Response
In fielding this survey, the AAHP combined it with a questionnaire for preferred provider organizations since many managed care organizations offer both types of products. The combined survey package was mailed to 2,054 health care organizations in early spring 1998. Whether these organizations were traditional HMOs, HMOs with a point-of-service (POS) option, or PPOs was unknown at that time, and the organizations were asked to indicate their enrollment in each of these options. Both AAHP staff and a survey contractor provided followup to encourage known HMOs to respond.
AAHP received 361 responses from HMOs that identified themselves as general medical/ surgical HMOs as distinct from specialty or workers' compensation HMOs; 347 of the 361 responses were usable. Some responses to the question asking whether the HMO was a general medical/surgical HMO were missing. In these cases, we determined from responses to other questions that 12 additional organizations were general medical/surgical HMOs and added them to the sample, giving us a final sample of 359 HMOs.
Our best independent estimate of the number of HMOs at that time comes from Interstudy data, which indicate 651 HMOs as of December 1997, implying an estimated response rate of 55% (359/651) (Interstudy 1996 (Interstudy , 1998 . (Most of the remaining 2,054 organizations to which the questionnaire was mailed were PPOs rather than HMOs.) In 24 of the 359 plans where enrollment data were missing, implausible, or inconsistently reported, we substituted 1998 Interstudy enrollment figures.
The bias from nonresponse appears minimal; on most dimensions (plan size, percentage federally qualified, ownership type, region, and tax status) the data reported by the plans in our sample are indistinguishable from the information reported by Interstudy (Table 1 , region data not shown). Ownership type and public program participation differ on a plan-weighted but not an enrollment-weighted basis. For simplicity, we have not adjusted results for these differences; none of our conclusions would change if we did. Moreover, the differences reported for the plan-weighted model types may be methodological; Interstudy asked plans to classify themselves, while we asked them to report the percentage of membership enrolled in each model type and then we classified plans.
Analysis Methods
We present selected descriptive data as means or rates, both as simple averages across plans and averages weighted by plan enrollment. We focus on the enrollment-weighted numbers, although they only approximate the experience of the average American enrolled in a managed care plan. To estimate the average American's experience more accurately, it would have been necessary to ask each plan to sample a particular enrollee at random and then to link that enrollee to his or her plan product (benefit options) and to his or her provider choices. Those we consulted within the industry, however, advised us that many plans, particularly smaller plans, did not have an information system that would permit such sampling. We therefore pursued a compromise strategy of asking plans about specific products in defined geographic areas; for example, for many questions we asked about the largest product in the county with the largest enrollment.
Results
Large Plans Dominate
In the 1990s, a common industry view was that size was a sine qua non for success. Plans, both for-profit and not-for-profit, acquired or merged with other plans partly to wield more power over providers. The maxim was: ''No members, no leverage; no leverage, no members.'' Indeed, some prominent managed care plans followed a strategy of growth almost irrespective of profitability, on the premise that profitability would follow. 3 Leverage, however, must be exercised in the context of a local market, whereas our enrollment information is at the state level; thus, in assessing leverage we assume that plans that have a large number of enrollees at the state level also have a large number in the local markets within the state.
Reflecting the advantages of size, the great majority of enrollees, 81%, were members of the one-third of plans with more than 100,000 enrollees in the state (Table 1) . 4 By contrast, the one-third of HMOs with fewer than 25,000 enrollees had only 3% of the enrollees.
Because they account for the provider's entire or near-entire book of business, group and staff model plans should have the greatest ability to control moral hazard and improve quality. 5 As is well known, however, their share of the HMO market, which was very high 30 years ago, has greatly declined, implying that they have failed to convince the marketplace that they in fact deliver these advantages or that any advantage is not worth the price of decreased enrollee choice. In 1996, only 24% of all HMO enrollees were in group and staff model plans, and by 2001 this figure had fallen even further to 11% (Gabel et al. 2001) . 6 The initial HMOs, such as Kaiser, Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, and Harvard Community Health Plan, were not only group and staff model plans but also not-for-profit. By 1998, however, 58% of HMO enrollees were in for-profit plans (Table  1) . 7
How Plans Contract with Physician Groups Varies by Size of Plan and Size of Physician Group
The dominant method a plan uses to contract with physicians depends upon its size, as well as the size of the physician group with which it is contracting (Table 2) . We classify a plan as predominantly using capitation if more than 50% of its enrollees are seen by primary care physicians or physician groups with whom it contracts on a capitated basis. Similarly, we classify it as predominantly fee-for-service (FFS) if more than 50% of its enrollees are seen by physicians or groups with whom it contracts on a FFS basis. Ninety-three percent of enrollees were in plans that fell into one of these two categories; the remaining 7% were either in plans that employed salaried physicians or had no dominant pattern in their method of contracting.
Our results are not sensitive to the cutting point of 50% of enrollees covered by capitation or FFS because most health plans tended to use almost entirely one method of contracting or the other. More than 80% of the plans that we classified as ''predominantly capitation'' used capitation to pay for the care of more than 75% (and possibly all) of their enrollees, and more than 90% of the plans classified as ''predominantly fee-for-service'' used FFS for more than 75% of the care of their enrollees. The question's highest category asked about ''75% or more of enrollees,'' so it is possible that plans used exclusively one method or the other.
This simple method of classifying plans has the important flaw of failing to distinguish what services are included in the capitation. In general, however, the capitation was limited to the primary care physician's own services and did not include inpatient services other than the primary care physician's own inpatient visits. Only a minority of plans ''always'' or ''usually'' (''usually'' was defined as 67% to 99% of the time) included inpatient services (29%), outpatient referrals (25% to 28% depending on weighting), or prescription drugs (8%) in the capitation rates (results not shown).
Although 53% of plans used predominantly fee-for-service as a basis for contracting with physician groups, such plans tended to be smaller, having only 35% of enrollees. By contrast, 58% of enrollees were in plans that contracted mostly on the basis of capitation. Because larger physician groups can better bear risk from random variation, it is not surprising that the use of capitation rose with the size of the physician group with which the plan contracted. But it was surprising that 46% of enrollees were in plans that contracted with small groups of physicians (under five people) mostly by capitation. As already noted, however, the capitation was usually for the physician's own services, in which case group size would be less important (though still of potential importance). 8 Moreover, we do not know how many such groups the large plans contracted with, nor how many enrollees within these plans received their care from such small groups.
Plans Generally Do Not Subcontract
Plans tend to subcontract or carve out a service if buying the service is cheaper than producing it. 9 With the exception of pharmaceuticals, however, plans infrequently subcontracted for or carved out services, suggesting economies if production were kept within the firm (enrollment-weighted data) ( Table 2 ). Only about onethird of enrollees were in plans that subcontracted for or carved out mental health, substance abuse, or vision services. Other services were subcontracted for or carved out even less. Subcontracting for oncology services almost never occurred.
Just as with physicians, when plans do subcontract, they may or may not extend risk to subcontractors in order to control moral hazard. With the exception of pharmacy services, plans did tend to place subcontractors at some financial risk, especially for mental health and substance abuse services and for chiropractic services. Indeed, the proportion of subcontractors at financial risk generally exceeded the proportion of physicians substantially, perhaps because these organizations are better able to manage risk.
Pharmacy subcontractors, primarily pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), are the exception. They may assume risk less frequently than other subcontractors because the physician, rather than the PBM, prescribes drugs. Our survey showed, however, that even PBMs were at some financial risk for a third of enrollees. One aspect of the debate over the Medicare drug benefit is whether PBMs-if Medicare contracts with PBMs-should be placed at risk (Huskamp et al. 2000) . In forming a view on this issue, our finding suggests that it may be useful to contrast private sector experience when PBMs are placed at risk relative to when they are not, a topic we leave for the future.
Most Beneficiaries Do Not Have Access to Any PCP in the Market
A key choice for a plan is the size of its network. As pointed out earlier, for a given enrollment, the larger the plan's provider network, the smaller will be its share of any given provider's business and thus the less leverage it will have with that provider. Indeed, consumer demand for more provider choice-and hence larger networks and a smaller concentration of patients at any provider-is commonly cited as a reason for the recent upsurge in medical costs (Robinson 2001).
We were better able to ascertain the consumer's range of choice for a primary care physician than for specialty services because plans may not routinely monitor specialists to whom PCPs do not refer. For this reason, we asked only about PCP choice. Despite the widespread view that physician networks are broad, as of 1998 the majority of enrollees were not in plans that gave them access to virtually any PCP; only 35% of enrollees were in HMOs that had 75% or more of the PCPs in the market in their network (Table 2) . And only about half were in plans that offered a point-of-service option (Table 2).
Nearly all plans used copayments; more than 94% of enrollees were subject to them. Medical care that is free at the point of service was highly unusual (data not shown).
Plans' Responsibility for Quality Assurance Does Not Depend on Contracting Arrangements, but Utilization Management and Network Management Do
Plans that contract with physician groups using FFS almost never delegate quality assurance functions, nor do they delegate utilization management and network management ( Table 2) . Not delegating utilization and network manage- ment, of course, is consistent with plans' retaining the function of controlling moral hazard. Plans that delegate risk using a capitation contract presented a different picture in our survey. Around a third of their enrollees were in plans that usually delegate utilization and network management to physician groups that have capitation contracts with the plan. These plans, however, also tended to retain responsibility for quality assurance.
Consistent with all types of plans' retaining responsibility for quality assurance, around three-quarters of enrollees were in plans that survey people who disenroll and that monitor waiting time at PCPs; 59% were in plans that survey the chronically ill (Table 3) . Eighty-three percent of plans reported that they regularly conduct provider satisfaction surveys. Only a minority of enrollees were in plans that adjust the compensation of the physicians with whom they contract for quality performance, however ( Table 2) .
As already noted, plans have greater ability and incentive to enforce compliance with quality improvement efforts, as well as negotiate more favorable prices, when their members are a larger share of a physician's practice (Beaulieu 1998) . Nonetheless, only a third of enrollees were in plans that require PCPs to accept a minimum number of the plan's patients (Table 4) . Clearly, plans are willing to have certain PCPs in their network, even if they have a small share of patients at that practice. Nonetheless, that 65% of enrollees are in HMOs with fewer than 75% of the PCPs in the market in their network (Table 2) suggests that most plans do have reasons to limit their networks.
Disease-management protocols are intended to improve quality of care, but their use varied by clinical problem. For example, most plans had a case management arrangement in place for high-risk pregnancies, but only a minority had such an arrangement for congestive heart failure (Table 4 ). This pattern may reflect the prevalence of various diseases among people under 65, the dominant age group among HMO enrollees. Whether it also reflects the plans' views of the efficacy of the management programs for various diseases is unclear. The use of disease management appears to have grown since 1998, however, particularly for congestive heart failure (Welch et al. 2002) .
Accreditation is a potential spur to quality improvement. Seventy-one percent of enrollees were in plans accredited by the National Committee on Quality Assurance (NCQA), the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), or URAC (also known as the American Accreditation HealthCare Commission) (data not shown). That more than a quarter of all enrollees were in unaccredited plans, however, implies that accreditation is not necessary for survival in the marketplace; perhaps patients hold physicians and hospitalsrather than plans-accountable for quality, despite plans' retaining responsibility for quality assurance.
In Forming Provider Networks, Plans Make Greater Use of Quality Measures in Choosing Hospitals than Physicians
A little more than 60% of enrollees were in plans that used objective measures of technical quality to choose hospitals for their network, and a little over half collected data on patient satisfaction with the hospital (Table 4 ). Of those plans that collected the data, considerably more plans fed back the data on satisfaction to hos- Plans made much less use of quality indicators for physicians than they did for hospitals. This is consistent with the vastly greater number of physicians than hospitals, which implies that there typically will be many fewer patients per physician than per hospital. This lack of observations at the physician level signals that physician-level quality indicators may be of dubious validity (Hofer et al. 1999 ).
Removal of a physician from a plan's network or decredentialing of a physician was extremely rare; fewer than two physicians per year were decredentialed by the average plan. Perhaps this reflected some combination of the lack of useful quality indicators, patients' desire for choice, and legal and regulatory restrictions, or initial screening of physicians. Nearly all plans, however, collected information on referral behavior of PCPs, as well as information on patient complaints and Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) quality measures (Table  4 ). Most such plans fed this information back to physicians.
PCPs' Scope of Autonomy Varies
The autonomy that plans grant the PCP varied by type of procedure and referral (Table 4 ). Nearly all plans allowed PCPs to authorize a referral to an orthopedic surgeon without preapproval, but only a little over half of enrollees were in plans that allowed PCPs to authorize arthroscopy. This could be because plans believed an orthopedic surgeon was better qualified to ascertain clinical need or because plans adopted stricter procedures for more elective procedures that might be more subject to moral hazard.
Discussion
Health plans vary substantially in size; whereas the largest third of plans enroll 81% of the HMO population, the smallest third enroll only 3%. Two conclusions, one substantive and one methodological, follow from the observation that the size distribution is far from uniform. First, there are clearly substantial advantages to size. Larger plans in any given local market have greater leverage with providers. In addition, multistate employers prefer national plans. Thus, although the health economics literature finds that economies of scale in health plans are exhausted at relatively modest sizes of 50,000 members or so (Wholey et al. 1996; Given 1996) , the advantages of size appear to extend well beyond this figure. Note, however, that the ability to raise prices by extracting rents from purchasers does not appear in the literature's estimates of economies of scale, which are based on estimated cost functions. Second, in tabulating percentages of plans with particular characteristics, it can matter substantially whether the percentages are simple counts of plans (plan-weighted) or are weighted by the number of enrollees (enrollment-weighted). We focus on the enrollment-weighted figures, because we believe they better approximate the arrangements that apply to the average person enrolled in an HMO.
We were particularly interested in plans' use of capitation and fee-for-service in contracting with physicians and physician groups for three reasons. First, although many studies have shown that plans receiving capitation deliver fewer services, especially inpatient services, than indemnity plans (Glied 2000; Huskamp 1999; Miller and Luft 1994, 1997; Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group 1993; Rosenthal 1999) , these studies generally have not inquired specifically into methods for compensating physicians (other than that group and staff model HMOs historically have tended to rely primarily on salaried physicians). 10 Some literature, however, shows that the degree of risk sharing in the physician's own compensation motivates behavior (Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor 2001; Newhouse 2002) . Second, fears and claims of underservice when plans contract with physicians on the basis of capitation have sparked a demand for patient protection legislation (Blendon et al. 1998) and also have formed a theory of damage in the class-action lawsuits now pending against the managed care industry (Havighurst 2001) . Finally, in light of the sparing use of utilization review (Remler et al. 1997; Remler, Gray, and Newhouse 2000) and the current trend toward more inclusive PCP networks, capitation appears to be a principal tool available to plans to reduce the use of low-valued services.
Perhaps for these reasons, capitation contracts were widespread in 1998; over half the plans in our sample contracted with primary care physician groups predominantly on the basis of capitation, whereas only around a third contracted predominantly on a fee-for-service basis (enrollment-weighted figures). The capitation, however, was limited generally to the primary care physicians' own services. Especially when capitation includes more than a PCP's own services, it seems likely that groups and plans would negotiate a stop-loss feature, either at the level of the case or at the level of the physician group, but we did not collect information on this point. Nor do we know whether a physician group reinsures any risk it assumes. Based on anecdotal evidence, the use of capitation may have declined since 1998, but we have no systematic evidence.
The use of capitation increases both with the size of the plan and the size of the physician group with which the plan is contracting. That capitation is more common among larger physician groups almost certainly stems from their greater ability to bear risk, but the reason why larger plans should use it disproportionately is less clear. Causation could, of course, run the other way; plans using capitation contracts may have advantages in the marketplace. Although use of capitation increases with the size of the physician group, it is reasonably common even among small physician groups, whose members comprise the majority of nonfederal patient care physicians practicing in noninstitutional settings. 11 Although oversimplified, the two-way classification of plans as predominantly using capitation or fee-for-service as a basis for contracting seems to capture an important feature of plan operations. Plans that contract predominantly on a fee-for-service basis almost never delegate quality assurance, utilization management, or network management to physicians. By contrast, plans that contract predominantly on a capitation basis do delegate utilization management and network management to groups 30% to 40% of the time (on an enrollment-weighted basis). Thus, along with greater financial exposure, capitation can bring greater physician autonomy. The degree of autonomy, however, varies by type of service. Nearly all enrollees use PCPs who can refer to an orthopedic sur-geon without obtaining prior approval, but only half use PCPs who can order an arthroscopy without prior approval. About two-thirds to three-quarters of enrollees have PCPs who can authorize an MRI of the spine, an emergency room referral, or a mental health referral without prior approval.
In contrast to network and utilization management, plans almost never delegate quality assurance functions. One could speculate on several reasons for this; in some cases, plans may believe they retain some liability, that their reputation is important, and that quality problems are widespread irrespective of the method of contracting (Brook 1997) .
Plan monitoring of referrals and of HEDIS indicators may well affect the patient encounter. The great majority of enrollees are in plans that monitor PCP referrals to specialists, with most plans who do monitor feeding back comparisons of referral rates to PCPs. Such information may reduce referrals and the cost of care with no deleterious consequences; however, financial and nonfinancial incentives to reduce referral rates may explain why about a quarter of PCPs perceive that the scope of care they are expected to provide is greater than they believe it should be (St. Peter et al. 1999) . Consistent with this speculation, such views are more common among physicians who derive some revenue from capitation or who are involved in gatekeeping arrangements, meaning that patients are required to seek permission before seeing a specialist. Almost without exception, plans monitor physicians for their performance on HEDIS indicators, suggesting the potential power of the HEDIS effort to alter physician practices.
As already described, patients' demand for choice of physician has prompted plans to have large networks with members spread across many physicians. Consistent with these demands, three-quarters of enrollees are in plans that do not require PCPs to accept a minimum number of patients. Nonetheless, almost twothirds of enrollees are in plans that contract with less than 75% of the PCPs in the market. Diffusion of enrollees across physicians lessens the incentive of plans to undertake physician-specific investments in quality improvement, since the returns to such investments will accrue to all plans (Beaulieu 1998) . For better or for worse, such diffusion also reduces plans' bargaining power with physicians and hence plans' ability to affect treatment choice or pricing.
Our survey has several limitations. Most importantly, the results are not linked to outcome and performance data. Such linking is necessary before ''best practices'' can be identified. Furthermore, although the characteristics of our sample appear to track closely with important characteristics of the universe of plans, the response rate to the survey was only 55%, and there was nontrivial nonresponse on certain items, raising the possibility that the results are not representative. Moreover, the data are a snapshot of 1998 arrangements, and the current situation may differ.
Finally and importantly, the arrangements between health plans and physician groups that we describe here are not the only arrangements relevant to the care patients receive, especially in the case of large physician groups that have accepted financial risk from plans. Those groups, including integrated delivery systems and physician-hospital organizations (PHOs), likely contract in an entirely different fashion with smaller groups or individual physicians than the capitated or other basis with which they contract with health plans. Thus, our survey does not capture the financial and nonfinancial incentives at the level of the physician who is looking at the patient. How incentives in the contract between a health plan and physician group are transmitted to and perceived by individual physicians remains an important research topic.
1 Comparisons are difficult for two reasons. Gold et al. (1995) present only plan-weighted results, and they present results for group and staff model HMOs, network and IPA model HMOs, and PPOs both separately and combined. The only points of comparison between the published results and our results, therefore, are the questions on group and staff model HMOs and IPA and network HMOs. For similar questions, the results Gold et al. found for these entities appear broadly consistent with our plan-weighted results, but, as we note later, plan-weighted and enrollmentweighted results can give different answers. 2 This figure comes from the Health Interview Survey.
3 A notable adherent to this strategy was Aetna, which acquired U.S. Health Care, Prudential, and NYLCare in the 1990s, thereby becoming the nation's largest managed care plan. Despite its size, however, it was among the least profitable plans in the industry. In 2000, it changed senior management and indicated it would pursue profitability rather than growth. It has since lost about 20% of its members and is no longer the largest plan. 4 This conclusion should be qualified because of the varying size of local markets. Even a plan with a small share of the New York City market, for example, could have 100,000 members. The converse, however, seems unlikely to be true; there are few metropolitan markets where a plan with fewer than 25,000 enrollees would have a dominant market share, and HMOs tend not to enter nonmetropolitan markets. Because of the difficulty in defining markets and the disparity in enrollment share between the top third and bottom third of plans, we have not pursued this further. 5 Because they must compete in the labor market for physicians, however, they have little ability to reduce any rents in physician incomes. 6 In our 1998 sample, 18% of enrollees were in group and staff model plans. 7 As Table 1 shows, over 70% of the plans are forprofit, implying that not-for-profit plans are disproportionately large. This simply may reflect the size of the Kaiser Health Plan. 8 The construction of the questionnaire did not permit us to determine whether limitation to a physician's own services was more common when contracting with a small group. Moreover, a capitation for only a physician's own services not only gives the physician an incentive to deliver fewer of his or her own services, but also an in-centive to substitute the services of other, possibly higher-priced physicians and health personnel. Substitution of the services of others in particular can potentially limit risk. 9 Employers may carve out a service when offering multiple plans in order to reduce selection (Frank et al. 1996; Frank and McGuire 1998) .
10 For salaried physicians, one would like to know the incentives for merit increases and promotions. 11 The exact distribution is as follows: solo physician, 38.0%; two physicians, 10.8%; three physicians, 8.7%; four to eight physicians, 19.9%; more than eight physicians, 22.6% (American Medical Association 1999).
